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Book Reviews
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
First Hundred Years, 1789-1888. By David
P. Currie. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986. 504 pp. Indexed. $55.00.)
In the introduction to this book, Professor
Currie succinctly states his intention: "My
aim is to provide a critical history, analyzing
from a lawyer's standpoint the entire constitutional work of the Court's first hundred
years. My search is for methods of constitutional analysis, for techniques of opinion
writing, for the quality of the performances of
the Court and of its members."
It is a formidable challenge to read every
Supreme Court decision involving constitutional issues between 1789 and 1888. It is an
impressive intellectual accomplishment to analyze the performance of every justice who
wrote an opinion in those cases. To analyze
critically over one hundred and forty cases
with clarity and convincing logic while summarizing all the remaining constitutional decisions of the period in the notes is extraordinary. To do this in 452 pages of text, excluding
appendices and indexes, is a minor miracle.
Yet that is just what Professor Currie has
done.
In order to accomplish this remarkable feat,
Currie had to keep his focus narrow. Every
justice who sat on the court between 1789 and
1888 is critiqued individually, but the judges
are reduced to their opinions. Those opinions
are analyzed in terms of legal craftsmanship
rather than placed in the context of the history of their time. The political struggle between Jefferson and the Federalists that provides the background for Marbury v. Madison
is buried in the notes. Currie does not even
mention the financial shenanigans of the officers of the Second Bank of the United States
in Baltimore that gave poignancy to the arguments of Maryland in McCulloch v. Maryland
that the bank was a private institution. He is
not interested in discussing in this book why
decisions turned out the way that they did, or
even what effect those decisions had upon society. His quest is for the technical competence of the opinions written to justifY the decisions.
The standards Currie applies are simple.
"Since the Constitution is law, the judges have
no right to ignore constitutional limitations
with which they disagree .... Beyond this, I
share the conventional views that judges have
an obligation to explain the reasons for their
decisions as concisely and persuasively as
practicable and that they should strive for
consistency, reserving the right to correct
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egregious and important errors on relatively
rare occasions." Judged by these criteria,
there are very few flawless constitutional
opinions in the first century of the court's existence (or, for that matter, in its second century).

The book begins with the frequently overlooked decisions of the court before John Marshall became Chief Justice. That Court invalidated a state law, engaged in judicial review
of federal legislation, established principles of
construction of constitutional issues and
fleshed out the jurisdictional framework of the
federal court system. Currie uncovers the
early pension cases cited by Marshall in Marbury u. Madison, including decisions never
published by the Court, and examines their
impact on the role of the Court.
After restoring the early work of the Court
to its proper claim on otir attention, Currie
discusses the decisions of the Court under
John Marshall. Those decisions have been extremely influential in shaping our nation.
Marshall gave federal powers a generous construction, and the Court under Marshall acted
vigorously in applying constitutional limits to
the states. But while Currie gives Marshall's
genius its due, he also takes Marshall to task
for inconsistency, for ignoring opposing arguments, and for overreaching. On the crucial
issues for decision, Marshall tended to be too
conclusory to suit Professor Currie. "In short,
though Marshall has been generally admired,
it is difficult to find a single Marshall opinion
that puts together the relevant legal arguments in a convincing way."
Taney lacked Marshall's statesmanship and
wrote a disastrous opinion in Dred Scott. N evertheless, Currie writes that Taney at his best
was not only clear but also extremely persuasive. Taney's opinion in The Genesee Chief, extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond tidewaters to the Great
Lakes, earns Currie's praise as an impressive
achievement. But Taney had formidable intellectual rivals on the court, notably Justices
Story and Curtis. Currie praises Story for his
dissent in The Charles River Bridge Case, although most modern critics are more likely to
agree with the majority in limiting the impact
of the contract clause on contracts made by
the state. Justice Curtis gathers laurels from
Currie for statesmanship in interpreting the
commerce clause, but only his dissent in Dred
Scott receives unconditional praise.
Justice Miller emerges as the star of the Supreme Court under both Chief Justices Chase
and Waite. But praise for Miller's "exemplary
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clarity and brevity" does not distract Currie was impossible to see why Chase had disfrom criticism of "a strong judge with unusu- sented because Chase "had agreed with
ally great abilities and little respect for the Slaughterhouses narrow interpretation of the
only clause relied on." In fact, Justice Field,
law."
Currie does not take issue with the substan- expounding a broad interpretation ofthe privtive outcome of many of the court's decisions ileges and immunities clause, stated in The
in the first hundred years. Even where he be- Slaughterhouse Cases that Chief Justice
lieves that an important decision distorted the Chase concurred with his dissent.
Such lapses by Currie are rare. This book
Constitution, he states that most of the time
the decision was fairly debatable. His funda- discusses virtually every constitutional decimental critique is of craftsmanship and not of sion of the Supreme Court in its first century,
result. The criticism may be warranted, but it giving a technical critique of all of the imporis surely only a partial view of the behavior of tant cases. The writing is clear. Given the
scope of the project, it is a model of brevity.
the Court.
Currie's list of great justices is short: Mar- Judged by his own criteria of explaining the
shall, Story, Taney, Curtis and Miller. He also reasoning of decisions as concisely and persuanotes the shortcomings of even the chosen few, sively as practicable, Currie has done a superb
castigating the invalidation of the Missouri job.
DAVID S. BoGEN
Compromise by Taney and others in Dred
University of Maryla~;d School of Law
Scott u. Sandford as the worst decision ever
written. Currie acknowledges that "from the
smug advantage of a century or two of hindsight, it is easier to find fault than to write a
good opinion; an attempt to rewrite Marbury
v. Madison is sobering even today." He selects
Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott as "the supreme
monument of the lawyer's craft in the first
century of constitutional adjudication." A
closer look at that opinion, however, suggests
that even Currie may not be critical enough.
Curtis's conclusion that the citizenship of a
free black depends on the status given free
blacks by the state of the individual's birth,
regardless of where the individual resides or
where he achieved freedom is not thoroughly
explained in the opinion. It produces weird
anomalies-the free black residing in a state
that regards free blacks as citizens would still
not be a citizen of the United States or of that
state if the state of his birth did not consider
free blacks to be citizens. A national citizenship based on birth and free status would
seem to be a more plausible decision.
The book is adapted from a series of articles
in law reviews. It follows law review format
with footnotes at the bottom of each page.
Thus, some pages have only a few lines of text
while the rest of the page is footnotes. The
format, however, is wise. It enables the reader
to follow the details of arguments in each case
and later doctrinal developments without
having to flip back and forth from one part of
the book to another.
In general, Currie gives a precise and accurate rendition of the decisions of the court.
However, there is at least one notable blooper.
He castigates Chief Justice Chase for dissenting in Bradwell v. Illinois, noting that it

